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We have made this work in English because of a lot of
english language readers.
Under this heading we are at the onset of a serial with a
study beginning here our colleague Costas.
This study deals with the way in which it has been removing
Yugoslav state and the destruction of the company which was both political and
economical has shown that the idea of "two systems in one "is
viable, can bring political prestige and prosperity until the day ... go to
disturb the world.
We bring to this problem for a number of reasons, among
which the fact that Romania was political and economic partner of primary
eastern block - Yugoslav republic is regarded as undesirable for the remainder
of that of C. A. E,R. and boycotted by them.
Another reason is that Romania had become dizident in
the communist block and the path that she had begun to go no longer enjoyed that
neither Eastern nor Western countries.And maybe that's why we've had a
revolution and now organizers say it will destroy us paternally and advised by
the same member wise that when they agreed they have kissed in places delicate
and on NATO and the Romanians.
And there are other reasons, but you'll find them in the
course of publication.
The study is particularly well-documented and argued and I
would ask that you patience to follow.
- nemotoujours -
We'll start with its introduction :
The Death of Josip Broz Tito on 4 May 1980 represented a
shock not only to Yugoslavia and in particular, in the case of western states.
The scale funeral bill would in his own honor - the largest in the history of
humanity - have to conclude a fact already knew: inheritance left behind to
will be a burden for the whole of Europe. Disappearing "hand of iron
"were born soon ethnic tensions and on the background to those
constitutional changes have been to the detriment of serbians; Kosovo was well
known on that which enraged spirits on international scene desiring to be
recognized as being a Yugoslav and not a province of a clear reason and simple:
this recognition should be got the green light of secession and therefore
independence.On this subject I'll axis in a separate chapter due to the
complexity of the situation on this this territory.
-Costas-
GO TO THE NEXT PAGE !
CHAPTER I
Subchapter 1.1 The
concept of the use of force in the view of international law
The
history of mankid in its display had an impact which is felt even today in its
level of complexity and persistence. Evolution has brought with itself benefits
and also destructive elements, the main cause being the undeniable link with
the human structure. If we make an incursion in the past we will find that the
events which determined major changes on the international scene were those
which implied military actions, the main instrument was often the uncontrolled force. However this dark side
lies in us human beings, in a latent state. Truly shocking and intriguing is lifting
it at the rank of state policy. This medieval and primitive reminiscence in
essence, hasn’t been eradicated and continues to endure in the collective
conception at a global scale.
A turning point was reached during
the two world wars which became both sources of rewriting the norms that guide
the nations and also a heavy heritage in the view of the normal course of
history. The political crisis in that period needed a bold and efficient
approach: the U.N. Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945[1]. Everything started to
materialize, a new stage that should have led to the much dreamt objective
became reality: peace between states. Yet a question regarding the durability
of this document was starting to take routes. The preamble of the Charter is
quite eloquent, it practically defines
the essence of this great importance document. The basis, in this case, is
maintaining peace and international security, device that was propagated
throughout time on different ways. The analysis, in the case of the use of
force by the states, can be summarized to two articles: article 2 (4) („All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations”), and article 51 („Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsability of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security”).
But
these provisions were formulated in 1945 and so a controversy is being raised: are
these anachronistic or there can be adapted to the present? Even if we find a
possible solution we must identify the organ which is entitled to do so in this
sense. The existence of the U.N.[2]
can reveal ourselves an answer in this direction. Starting from the Charter we
can consider that the practice of the states to use force in certain
circumstances is in the same way condemned or approved by two U.N. organs: General
Assembly (UNGA/GA)[3] and Security Council (UNSC)[4].
Regarding
the international security domain, the Security Council has the main role,
being the only organ that can adopt mandatory resolutions, based on Chapter VII
of the Charter. These resolutions can also have effects on the military side,
because article 42 in the Charter – „should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations”- implies the use of aerial, naval and
terrestrial forces. Noticeable is the phrase „take such action... as may be
necessary”; its ambiguity and general characteristic leave place for some
interpretations determines us to deduct that, in a certain manner, the use of
force itself may represent adequate measure in a given scenario. A
contradiction is revealed to us even from the start: being forbidden, force can
be used both by the state in the light of its right to self-defence -individually
and collectively- and by the U.N. The importance of this principle from article
2 (4) Charter was reiterated with the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of
the resolution 2625 (XXV)/1970[5].
Having in mind the aspects exposed
above, we will recall the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
in order to discover how this principle is viewed by the Court and what are the
consequences of an eventual infringement.
Subchapter 1.2 International Jurisprudence
The case which was on the Courts
list between the Republic of Nicaragua and United States in 1984[6] had a fundamental importance
in the light of the interpretation of the nonuse of force principle. The litigation started due
to the fact that U.S.A. wanted to replace the sandinist political regime in
Nicaragua, which had a communist doctrine, using guerilla troops called Contras
which engaged in different incursions at the border of the Nicaraguan state.
The Court, for reaching at a fair conclusion, established the content of the
law to be applied in this case. Therefore, the Court observed that the
principle of the nonuse of force which is in the U,N. Charter corresponds in
essence with the customary international law (chapter X, paragraph 2). The
custom is defined as a general practice, relative long and repeated by the
states, considered by them as an expression of rules of conduct with mandatory
legal force (a legal norm)[7]. Practical speaking, it is
the norm that must regulate in an obligatory manner the relations between
states. Then, the Court referred to the article 51- the inherent right to
self-defence- an exception of the principle affirmed above, this right activates
only in the case of an armed attack. Thus, the response to such attack must be
proportional and in the same time necessary. The particularity in this case was
that U.S.A. invoked in its defense the collective right of self-defense, due to
the fact that the troops loyal to the sandinist regime were also making
military incursions at the borders of the states in the vicinity, in our case
El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. After the review by the Court it was
revealed that the states weren’t victims of an armed attack, because the
incursions, viewed individually but also globally, can’t constitute an armed
attack; continuing with its explanations, the Court affirmed that the actions
initiated by the defendant state (financing, logistic support, equipment for
the guerilla troops) didn’t pay tribute to necessity and proportionality. It
was established that it was an infringement of the principle of the threat of
force or the use of force by the U.S.A. ( chapter XI, paragraph 1).
Another case judged by the Court, in
which there were reiterated the principles of the interdiction of the use of
force and of nonintervention, was that between the Democrat Republic of Congo
and Uganda[8]. On 23 June 1999, Congo addressed
a legal claim to the Court in the view of certain military actions- which make
an armed agression- perpetrated by the ugandan state on its territory. In a similar way with the case presented, there
is reference by Uganda to the self-defence right, in this situation we have a response to the frequent attacks by
paramilitary groups financed both by Sudan and Congo. Yet, the conclusion was
that despite the fact that there are no substantial proofs regarding the defenendant
states claims of presumptive implication of the two states in aiding the
paramilitary activities, the principle of self-defense can’t be called upon,
because the Ugandan state never reported to the Security Council that it is a
victim of an armed attack. Regarding the two principles, nonintervention and
nonuse of force, it was revealed an infringement by Uganda in occupying some
territories and the help (financial, logistic, military) offered to the armed
groups which took part in military actions at the border with Congo.
Although these two reference cases
contain a firm interpretation of the principles transposed in the Charter, the
international community was often put in an ungrateful position: to blame or to
support a military intervention which does not fully respect the international
norms, some even being contrary to them! The necessity to substantiate every
belligerent action created a series of exceptions which states embraced and
promoted.
Subchapter 1.3 Humanitarian
intervention
This justification wasn’t invoked
deliberately until recently, doctrine opinions being divided in this sense. The
premise from which it can start for the application of this principle can be
sometimes shadowed by other interests; relevantly is the case referred to
previously, that of Nicaragua against U.S.A., where even if it wasn’t explicitly
brought into discussion by the Americans, the court concluded that the measures
which United States decided to take by using force weren’t proportionate and
close to defend rights eventual violated. The country that decided to elaborate
such a doctrine was Great Britain; this was the justification which it
formulated in the case of the military intervention, first of this kind, in
Iraq caused by the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi troops. The purpose of the
intervention was to protect the shya and Kurdish minorities, oppressed under
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Also, Great Britain stated the conditions necessary
for using the instrument of humanitarian intervention[9]:
an imperative and urgent situation, characterized by an extreme humanitarian
threat which imposes immediate assistance; the other state can’t or is
unwillingly to take into consideration or to eliminate the threat; the
nonexistence of a practical alternative to that of the intervention to
eradicate the threat; the action must be limited in time and purpose.
This new vision raised many
controversies, all of this being reduced to a fair question: does article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter allow humanitarian intervention? This article, in
accordance with the parties that accepted this theory, must be viewed in a dynamical
perspective, flexible which is beyond the views from 1945. Forward steps were
taken in the same direction, a parallel being made between the fundamental
human rights and humanitarian intervention: both would be ius cogens norms. The
definition of these norms can be found in the Vienna Convention from 1969 on
the Law of the Treaties in article 53[10].
Still, for this theory to be viable we have to see in what matter the right of
humanitarian intervention is accepted and recognized as human rights are. For
this, humanitarian intervention is viewed as a right which is in the state of forming
itself, a crystallization process due to the fact that it isn’t provided
expressly anywhere. The challengers of this right deny this kind of
interpretation, because an unilateral action is excluded by the Charter itself
based on Chapter VII- only Security Council can decide upon a military action,
unconcerned of the objective or legal justification. In the „Report of the
Secretary- General on the work of the Organization” from 1999, the conclusion
over the global security was the following: ”What is clear is that enforcement
actions without Security Council authorization threaten the very core of the
international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations.
Only the Charter provides a universally accepted legal basis for the use of
force” [11].
The division of opinions is clearly
visible and leaves place for many interpretations in different ways. Kosovo
case became notorious in the way of humanitarian intervention but an exhaustive
elaboration i will make in Chapter 2.
Subchapter 1.4 Democratic
intervention
The second thesis became visible as
a result of the end of the Cold War[12].
The distribution of power spheres brought to a bipolarization of the
international scene thus proving to be a good pretext for some states to get
involved in belligerent acts. A telling example is that of the Panama invasion
by American troops in 1989. Americans stated that they used the collective
right of self-defense for saving the lives of their compatriots, which were
endangered under the dictatorial regime of Manuel Noriega and that the Treaty
of Panama Channel could be violated by the new regime. Frankly, the restoration
of democracy wasn’t in itself a necessity, which animated the Americans, but
only an indirect result, hence the existence of a distinction between legal
justification and purpose of the action.
There was a moment when a military
intervention with the purpose of restoring democracy was supported even by
U.N., that in Haiti, which was authorized by Security Council in 1994 after the
coup d’etat from 1991.We have to note that it was not meant to create a
precedent, but due to the circumstances and particularities of the
situation at that time, there was a
danger taking shape in the Caribbean region and a solution by any means was
imperative Having in mind the things
exposed above, i will present in detail a conflict that shocked the whole world
and continues to do so for the simple fact that it occured on the „old
continent” , a land of liberty and wisdom!
Chapter II
Subchapter 2.1. The
history of the Yugoslav state
In order to fully understand the
disintegration of Yugoslav republic, we have to appeal to history of which can
offer explications of its birth and disappearance. Bosnia and Herzegovina
played a prime role in this display of events, being so we can start the
analysis with it. The particularity of this republic is that it has a profound
multiethnic structure, more than the rest of the yougoslav republics. Initial,
of over 400 of years, Bosnia was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the north and
west was border on Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus resulting in a military
frontier between the two empires which brought to the presence of a significant
Serbian population-which is even in nowadays- who had the task to protect the
territories of Austro-Hungarians against the ototmans starting with the XVI
century. Both the religion and Muslim culture on Bosnian territory are thanked
to the Turqish occupation, hence a certain number of Slavs converted to Islam.
This ethnical and cultural mosaic is completed with the Croat population in the
south-west part of Bosnia, closed to Dalmatian coast. In 1878, the
Austro-Hungarian Empire occupies Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexing it in 1908.
After the first world war and also as a result of the disappearance of the
Habsburg Empire, the „Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians” was born
out of the unification of the Serbian Kingdom with: Montenegro, Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1929 the kingdom turns into Kingdom of Yugoslavia
( Kingdom of South Slavs). Among a ethnic diversity there was also a religious
one which exists also in the present : Catholicism in the north-west of the
kingdom and Orthodoxism and Islamism in the south-east.
During the second world war, the power of
the Axis[13] invaded Yugoslavia, and a
part of the territory was enclosed to Italy. Other two parts got under the
administration of Bulgaria and Hungary. The rest of the territory belonged to
the Croatian state which was a „puppet-state” under the authority of the Axis.
A part of Serbia became German Protectorate. This period was a dark one for
Yugoslavia, being marked with repressions and brutal treatments applied to the
minorities. An armed conflict for national liberation sparked degenerating into
a civil war. There were three combatant parties: Ustaše forces of the Croats
supported by Axis, Chetnics- Serb nationalists which protected the monarchy-
and Partizans- Serbian group with communist orientation; the last two opposed
to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Eventually, Partizans under the guidance of
Josip Broz, later known as Marshal Tito, obtained victory. Much of the bloody
conflicts occurred on Bosnian territory at the border with Croatia, the
majority were against the serbian population which was massacred by the Ustaše forces
in 1941. The number of deaths reached one quarter of a million Serbs, but the
exact number isn’t known. Despite all of this other ethnic groups were also
subjected to repressions, Partizans killed Muslims and Croats in 1941 in
Prijedor region and in 1945 near Kozarac. The revenge of the Serbs against Croats
culminated after the Croatian state surrendered to the Allies and the execution
by Partizans of 100.000 Croat soldiers.
With Tito taking power, different
methods were used to suppress every nationalist tendencies. Under the
Constitution of 1946, the Yugoslav state was composed of six republics: Serbia,
Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro plus two
autonomous provinces: Vojevodina and Kosovo. A differential aspect was that the
Bosnian nation wasn’t recognized at first due to the lack of ethnic homogeneity
on its land, this changed in 1974 when Muslims were recognized as one of the
nations, peoples of federal Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav state was structured under
soviet model: heavily centralized- Belgrade was the administrative center of
all the republics- and the exercise of religious rights very much limited;
although at first sight it may not seem a element of great importance, the
religious mosaic- Christians, Catholics, Muslims- can be a vivid reminder of
the historical divisions which stood as ground for fierce rivalries. The core
which was formed would soon be destroyed by political tensions and certain
external interests which will be revealed in the following subchapter.
Subchapter 2.2 The
crumble of the state- the dissipation of the „Great Serbia” dream
The socialist stiffness of federal
type was fully affected by the adoption of a new Constitution in 1974. It
provided the replacement of the president office who was at that time Tito,
with the Presidency of Yugoslavia composed of nine members: one representative
from each republic and from the autonomous provinces ( Vojevodina and Kosovo);
this system was based on a mechanism of rotation constituted in mandates on
short terms. The importance of this constitution resides from the fact that it
makes a sudden pass from a heavily admnistrative centralization at one based
more on self determination and greater legislative freedom for the republics.
Now the influence of Belgrade was limited on just taking and applying the
decisions regarding the two provinces, but even those had the right to vote so
they could oppose.
The death of Josip Brotz Tito on 4 may
1980 represented a great shock not just for Yugoslavia, but even more for the western
countries. The amplitude of the funeral in its honor- the biggest in the
history of mankind- revealed an already known fact: the heritage left behind
would be a heavy burden for the whole Europe. Now that the „iron hand” was
gone, soon ethnic tensions raised which were also encouraged by the
constitutional changes which were against the Serbian interests. Kosovo was the
most which inflamed the spirits on the international scene, the purpose was to
be recognized as republic and not a province for a clear and simple motive:
this would have meant green light for secession and independence. On this
matter i will emphasize in a different subchapter due to its complexity.
Although i started with politics, i
am forced to make a change in my account for chronological reasons and to
approach other domain that stood at the base of the disintegration of the
state, that of the economy. At first Yugoslavia was a industrial power in the
region, having a economy of success: a raise of its annual GDP in average with
6,1% ( more than other states in the West of Europe), the medical service was
free, the right of a place to work was guaranteed and life expectancy was at 72
years. A socialist economy, but with distinctive elements: companies with
private capital, industry under the state’s control and working cooperatives.
Being situated at the border between east and west, Boris Tito fully exploited
this fact acting as a mediator in the Balkan region between the two power
poles, being in the same time one of the main founders of the Group of the 77[14]
and of the Non-Aligned Movement [15].
After some years after Tito’s death, the yugoslav economy started to visibly
decline. In 1984 the administration of Reagan[16]
issued the National Security Decision
Directive 133[17], its provisions were made
public in 1990; it clearly specifies the american policy regarding Yugoslavia.
One of the measures draws attention in a special manner and will trigger a
series of actions which will bring the yugoslavs into their knees: in the last
phrase of the fourth paragraph it states:” U.S. policy will be to promote the
trend toward an effective, market-orientated Yugoslav economic structure”. In
conclusion, the dismemberment of a state with a social approach which didn’t
correspond to the democratic standard characterized by a rapacious corporatism.
The context of this document was that of distribution of the spheres of
influence, emphasized on the south-east region, all of this caused by the
political and economical crissis in U.S.S,R. The document will influence the
„democratic interventions” in the future of the american administration. The
scenario created is as subtle as it can be, but also diabolical-„How to destroy
centuries of history in some years” by Ronald Reagan.
The yougoslav regime was at a
turning point, so the American Congress decided to send in 1988 counselors from
National Endowment for Democracy –N.E.D. This non-profit organization was
financially supported by America and had as objective to promote democracy and
capitalist principles, but in reality was nothing but an instrument by which
political interests were accomplished by the American state. These counselors
used different methods, especially financial ones, by which opposition,
N.G.O.’s for human rights and journalists received considerable aid. This
organization has in its structure an institution called Center for
International Private Enterprise- C.I.P.E. which is under the umbrella of
American Chamber of Commerce; this center created „Group 17” – G17: N.G.O. formed
by 17 economists who promoted the principles of liberal market, three of whom
were members of the World Bank and International Monetary Founds: Dušan
Vujović, Željko Bogetic şi Branko Milanović. The
coordinator of this organization in Yougoslavia was the minister of
privatization Veselin Vukotic, collaborator of World Bank and the main pawn in
implementing the program which fallowed to bankrupt commercial companies, both
public and private, in the end being closed or sold at low prices. In a relative
short period of a year (1989-1990) 1.100 were bankrupted. These measures were
accompanied by those which destroyed the social character of economy such as
reducing the salaries and the suspension of state subsidies. This network with
international ramifications contributed in impoverishing the people- the
unemployment rate rose with 20%- this economical framework being propitiously
for rising social tensions which will become ethnical. Practically, we have
assisted at the plantation of extremely dangerous seeds which will know
uimaginable consequences. The visit of prime-minister Ante Marković in United
States in 1989 in which he tried to obtain financial help of a billion dollars,
was an alarm signal raised to the international community. The answer took a
legislative form in the shape of a law adopted by the American Congress on 5 November
1990 – Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1991. This law in an elaborate one containing methods by which America
will get involve in different international problems in that period of time; at
a closer look we will find section 599A[18].
YUGOSLAVIA
SEC.
599A. Six months after the date of enactment of this Act, (1) none of the funds
appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be
obligated or expended to provide any direct assistance to the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and (2) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States Executive Director of each international financial institution to use the
voice and vote of the United States to oppose any assistance of the respective
institutions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to assistance intended to support democratic parties or
movements, emergency or humanitarian assistance or the furtherance of human
rights: Provided further, That this section shall not apply if all six
of the individual Republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have held
free and fair multiparty elections and are not engaged în a pattern of
systematic gross violations of human rights: Provided further, That
notwithstanding the failure of the individual Republics of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to have held free and fair multiparty elections
within six months of the enactment of this Act, this section shall not apply if
the Secretary of State certifies that the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is making significant strides toward complying with the obligations
of the Helsinki Accords and is encouraging any Republic which has not held free
and fair multiparty elections to do so.
It strictly refers to Yougoslavia
and to the measures which will be taken reagrading its faith:
1. The yougoslav republics will have to organize, within six months
of the enactment of the act, free elections in each republic
2. The financial aid will be distributed individualy to each republic
and only to democratic parties or movements which militate for human rights- of
course this criteria is met only in the case that these entities are in
accordance with american standards and interests
In my view these
provisions mentioned above don’t represent a political blackmail, but more of a
death sentence; without any doubts in the light of these pieces of information,
the internal tensions in the Yugoslav republic didn’t predate but escalated due
to the foreign intervention. This is how a state- which is perceived as a
„policeman of justice and democracy” infringes a fundamental U.N. principle,
that of non intervention in internal affairs of another state (Article 2 - „The
Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles: 7.Nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Chapter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII”).
Isn’t economical blackmail a manifestation of the use of force by the
states? The disintegration of the Yugoslav state was genuine or artificially
created? Leaving these rhetorical questions that lead us to new ones, i will
expose the effects of this American law. In 1991 the inflation had a
hallucinating increase of 200%, the government being in incapacity of payment
to its creditors and republics and in the end, the whole fiscal system
collapsed. Parliamentary elections were organized so republics started to
unliterally declare their independence: the first were Slovenia and Croatia on
25 June 1991 and recognized by the European Community on 15 Janurary 1992;
Macedonia did it in September 1991,
Bosnia in March 1992, recognized by U.S.A. and EC in april. After these
changes, in April 1992 the Yugoslav Federal Republic was born, formed by Serbia
and Montenegro. Republics becoming free were governed by nationalist parties
who exacerbated the cultural, ethnical and religious differences, thus a
military conflict becoming an efficient way to settle up.
Subchapter 2.3 Bosnia
Herzegovina – Europe’s open wound
The disintegration of federal Yugoslavia
was soon followed by the Bosnian one, the perspective of a real war in the
region started to appear. The lack of ethnical uniformity- in the same
territory living Serb Bosnians, Croat Bosnians and also Muslim Bosnians - made
things more complicated. The leadership of the state had a visible diversity:
the president was a muslim, president of Parliament was serb and the
prime-minister was a croat. A strong anti muslim wave marked beginning of the 90’s, both the serbs and
croats wanted to exclude the muslims from the leadership of the state. All of
these obstacles could have been overpass and there would have been no military
escalation if the Peace Plan „Carrington-Cutileiro” would have been
implemented; this initiative had its roots in the Peace Conference organized by
the European Community in February 1992. The document proposed a system which
awarded the power to the local ethnic communities, without any central
government, but local ones and in the same time the state would have been
structured in districts which belonging to the minorities, even though they
didn’t have the majority in them. Initially the serbs rejected the plan because
they considered they were entitled to 2/3 of the bosnian land, leaving behind
the other rights of the minorities; the plan was revised, and on 18 march 1992
the representatives signed: Izetbegović
Alija – for the muslims, Radovan Karadžić – for the serbians, Mate Boban – for
the croats. Surprisingly, on 28 March, Izetbegović Alija withdrew its signature
after meeting with the american ambassador in Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann.
The reason behind this action would have been that of a solid assurance from
United States regarding the recognition of the independence, which did happen in
April that year.
The president of the Republic of
Serbia Slobodan Milošević (1989 – 1997), subsequently of the Yugoslav Federal
Republic (1997-2000), represents a key player in the future events. Charismatic
politician, having built a true personality cult, exerted a great influence
over the serbian media, including that in serb dominated regions in Bosnia. In
a convincing way, serbians were manipulated by appealing to atrocities committed
against them, factor which inflamed their nationalistic spirit. Peace that
reigned among the communities was transformed, in a systematic and efficient
way, in one of fear, hostility and mistrust. Politics and media played a
fundamental role in dividing the state
on nationalist lines.
In april 1991, several serbian
communities associated creating a structure which initially had only economic
powers and not administrative; these structures existed especially in zones
were serbs held the majority. Even so, in a relative short period of time and
using these structures, separate Parliaments and police forces appeared,
eventually culminating with the proclamation of some autonomous serb regions
excluded from the bosnian government:Krajina, Romanjija şi Stara Hertegovina. In
March 1992, the Popular Parliament of the Serbs in Bosnia Hertegovina, who’s
president was Radovan Karadžić, proclaimed the Constitution of the Serbian
Republic in Bosnia- Srpska Republica- thus becoming a distinct republic. A
tragic event that triggered all these moves took place at the beginning of the
month: a muslim opened fire at a serbian wedding, killing the father of the
groom. During the same night, armed serbs organized barricades inside Sarajevo.
Neither the police nor the bosnian army didn’t have at their disposal
sufficient weapons to repeal the rebellion; the city center belonged to the
muslims, and the rest of the city, including the hilltops surrounding the city,
to the serb militias. A eventual conflict terrified the population. On 3 march,
the leader of the serbs Radovan Karadžić and that of the bosniaks,Izetbegović
Alija, met and reached a compromise. But the fate of Bosnia will be decided in
the end: Slobodan Milošević and the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudman, divided
the state along the river of Neretva. At these discussions, no representative
of the muslims attended.
From this moment, Milošević’s plan
started to take ground; a military intervention in Bosnia orchestrated by the Yugoslav
Federal Army would have been promptly sanctioned by the international
community. As supreme commander of the army, he ordered the transfer of every
bosnian serb from the yougoslav army in units which were on bosnian territory-
a total of 8.000 soldiers fully equipped, having at their disposal including
tanks and heavy weaponary. In addition there were also paramilitary troops:
armed by the secret yougoslav police and leaded by nationalists; Among them,
remarkable was Željko Ražnatović, also known as „Arkan”, the leader of the
group ”Tigers of Arkan”. A considerable amount of atrocities that had occurred,
were committed by these groups and not serbian soldiers. First captured city,
in three days, was Bijeljina, with a significant strategic
importance. In this place, Arkan’s troops rounded the activists of the Muslim
Party and executed them; in this sense we have proofs regarding their actions
and presence, photos made by the photographer Ron Haviv who was invited by
Arkan.
[19]
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| 3 |
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| 4 |
As a consequence of the events in
Bijeljina, president Alija made an appeal to the whole population, careless of
ethnicity, to protect the states integrity. On 5 April 1992, the streets in
Sarajevo were flooded with thousands of people who managed to occupy the
building of the Parliament. They opposed to nationalist policies promoted by
both Alija and Karadžić; the latter was in Holiday’s Inn hotel close to the
Parliament and ordered his militias to suppress mass of the people which headed
towards the hotel. Serbian snipers who were on the roof of the hotel opened
fire and killed six civilians. Bosnian police managed to regain order in the
city. Troops loyal to Karadžić retreated from the city and launched an attack
with mortars using the advantage of the hilltops. Attention was moved to other
territories in Bosnia: where serbs were the majority, those were brought the
control of the serbian military units but, where muslims had the majority, the
mayors of those cities received order to surrender. The city which was first
occupied Zvornik[20], the artillery barrage
offered protection to the paramilitary troops who continued what they had
started in Bijelina. From 49.000 muslims who lived in the city none remained,
some were killed and others deported in concentration camps! Ethnic cleansing
operations start to take shape. On 2 may 1992 the assault on Sarajevo began,
initiated by the serbian federal troops; it was attacked on three side, being
encircled in this manner. Artillery, serbian fighter jets contributed in
creating a chaotic atmosphere in the city. Commander of the troops in Sarajevo
was named Ratko Mladić. In the course of the same month, on 22, Bosnia Herzegovina
became member of the U.N. [21] along with the republics
which declared independence. A problem of international law was raised by
Bosnia: in 1991 the resolution of the Security Council 713[22]
imposed a military embargo on the whole yougoslav territory- member of U.N.
since 1945- based on Chapter VII, so it had binding effect. Bosnia invoked that
now it represents a new entity in U.N. and claimed the inapplicability of the
embargo, because it’s no longer a yugoslav republic. The inherent right of
self-defense of each state enshrined recognized in article 51 has priority over
the measure taken by the Security Council and needs to be lifted in order to
assure defense against Serbia and
Montenegro. Debates started in the Security Council where different opinions emerged:
lifting or suspending the measure, inapplicability to Bosnia. In the end, the
Council remained with its initial decision fearing of a dangerous precedent [23].
This decision i consider
questionable, mainly because the bosnian state was practically deprived of a
fundamental right which activates itself in certain circumstances. Clearly,
exceptions are of strict interpretation and this why they are being applied in
a restrictive manner, in our case the use of force; the bosnian armory was insufficient
and inferior to the serbian one. This disadvantage didn’t hinder a series of
ferocious attacks conducted in the villages around Srebrenica, where the
majority were serbians.; these belligerent actions were coordinated by Naser Orić,
an officer of the Bosnian Army (1992-1995) from Srebrenica. Serbian population
of Kravica[24]
was massacred sadistically, the attack having also profound religious
connotations: muslims against christians; 50 serbs were mutilated and executed.
On 16 April 1993, Security Council voted the resolution 819[25]
based on Chapter VII; this document should have ended the military and humanitarian
crisis in Bosnia. Srebrenica, and other cities around it became „safe areas”.
The initial resolution proposed by the permanent venezuelan representative at
the U.N., Diego Arria, had the syntagm „safe haven” this meant the protection
of Srebrenica by the peacekeeping troops. Western states didn’t want this,
considering that a complete military protection can’t be viable, everything
reduced to prevent the attacks from Srpska’s army. Putting all together, we
realize that the international community never wanted a direct confrontation,
moreover a military one with Belgrade. Next day, the resolution to the two
generals: Ratko Mladić şi Sefer Halilović. Mladić was clear: Srebrenica will be
spared if the muslim population would lay down their weapons. In the same time,
muslims must stop the attacks against serbians. Srebrenica and other cities would
become demilitarized zones and this situation would be monitored by U.N.’s
peacekeepers. Finally, the two reached consensus. But these conditions were by
no means respected- bosnian army surrendered only part of its armament- but a
flagrant infringement was brought to light in a report[26]
from 2002 published by Netherlands Institute for War Documentation. I will stop
the chronological course of events to present some proofs. In this report events
prior, during and after the siege of Srebrenica are being documented; what i
will expose it can be found in more detail in Annex 2 of the document,Chapter
4, page 2744. From the first paragraphs there is a reference of a discovery
made by the american secret agency (C.I.A.) on 4 September 1993: a Boeing 747
belonging to the national company Iran Air, was on Zagreb’s airport. Inside the
plane were found military equipments all destined for the bosnian army, the
whole cargo was confiscated by the americans. On 1 November, another iranian
Boeing 747 landed on the same airport in Zagreb, this time with humanitarian
aid. From the beginning of 1992 deals were being made for mutual aid between
three states: Iran, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina; the leaders met several
times in the view of boosting their diplomatic and economic relations. Turkey
put itself on the list in 2002 by offering military aid directly to the bosnian
state. The american administration was in a dilemma: to take part or not in
these operations. Interest in the region was relatively high, the balkans
representing a window for the Middle East. A new strategy regarding this
conflict was configured: lifting the arms embargo imposed by resolution 713
previously mentioned and an energetically use of the air forces against serb
forces in case of their possible opposition at the humanitarian transports. Clinton
was in favor of this change of optics, but the european states rejected on pure
political reasons: the U.N. soldiers were their own citizens, and an eventual
escalation of the conflict would have meant casualties among them. The fact
that the flux of weapons continued unhindered was because of the american state
that didn’t take any actions to stop this flagrant violation of the resolution,
even though they had knowledge, and in the same time due to a flaw in the
provisions of the resolution that didn’t mandate the peacekeeping troops to
monitor eventual violations of the embargo or to effectively implement it.
Operation „Croatian pipeline” officially received the green light from the
americans in 1994, in the shape of the Washington Agreement which laid down the
basis of a Federal Bosnia and Herzegovina composed in bosnian and croatian
territories. The fact that Iran was directly involved in this network involving
weapons smuggling operations was for U.S.A. a big concern, that of inoculating extremist
ideologies in the balkans, which would have become in time a matter of national
security; also, president Alija was himself worried for the fact that croatians
held an exclusive control on the military supply from Iran, confrontations
between these two balkan states occurred in the past.
In 1995, operation „Black Flights”
entered on the scene of this conflict: several Hercule C130 planes overflow the
bosnian airspace and delivered military equipments on Tuzla airport, one of the
biggest in Bosnia. These were seen by the U.N. personnel who were nearby the
airport. The cargo contained: light weapons, ammunitions, uniforms and anti-tank
arms. The cargo was then taken by bosnians and transported in the town of Zepa
having as final destination Srebrenica. General Mladić complained over these
violations of the deal it had with the bosnian counterparts regarding the
demilitarized zone. Although the provenance of these airplanes wasn’t
discovered, because there wasn’t any distinctive sign on them, all the looks
concentrated on the americans who initiated in their name a series of counter
reports which contradicted those of the U.N. The explanation for the presence
of the C130’s and of the two fighter jets which escorted them was that of a
military drill conducted in cooperation with N.A.T.O. Some hints drives us to
America’s implication in this operation: a number of bosnian soldiers were seen
wearing new uniforms, having on them the american flag and also during the interval of time in which the deliveries were
occurring ( during the night in all the cases ), radar aircrafts AWACS
type which were in the vicinity of the
airport either didn’t function, or onboard were american crews. Another
explanation of these flights was of Turqey’s implication which had in its air
fleet these type of Hercule and which took off from the occupied territory in
Cyprus. Undisputed is that the americans facilitated these operations by the measures taken
regarding air monitoring. In the light of international law these flights
infringed two fundamental resolutions adopted by the Security Council: the
first 713, and the second 816[27], the latter forbidden any
type of flight over the bosnian territory. These violations weren’t sanctioned,
occurring under the international community eyes, no state putting an end to
them.
Accusations were also from the
bosnian side who claimed that serbians were arming themselves and were
receiving heavy weapons, including tanks, and that this support came from the
border zone between Republic of Srpska and the yugoslav state. The report makes
reference to the fact that even though rumors existed regarding the military
actions, there were no clear proofs found in the U.N. archives. The aid was
limited only to logistical support, supply of military components, communication
equipment and payments to the military personnel of the Republic of Srpska. The
result of the report was that the implication of Belgrade although existed, it
wasn’t in a direct manner.
The conclusion in this case was
reiterated in the verdict of the International Court of Justice in the case „ Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” between
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro[28].
The argument of the court started from the international rule by which an act
committed by a organ of a state which infringes norms of international law is
attributed to the state itself. In this sens there is no clear evidence to
affirm that both Republic of Srpska, and its army are organs of the yugoslav
stare from the point of view of the national yugoslavian law. In favor of this
reasoning it was invoked the previous jurisprudence of the court–Nicaragua vs
U.S.A. case- in which it was specified that individuals, groups of persons or
entities can be viewed as acting in the name of the state with the condition of
being completely dependent on it. As so, in our case, it couldn’t be proved
that the individuals or entities who committed
acts of genocide in Srebrenica represented an instrument of Belgrade,
being assimilated to it; on the other hand, Yugoslavia truly offered substantial support to the Republic of
Srpska, mainly pecuniary (payments to the officers of Sprka’s army ), but this
didn’t imply the ideea of a organ of the yugoslav state. The next step was for
the Court to analyse the control manifested by Belgrade, although they weren’t
organs of the state a question of acting in the light of the instructions or
control from the yugoslav state appears. The customary norm regarding
international liability dictates that the conduct of a individual or group of
individuals would be considered as being of the state based on international
law, if that individual or group acts in fact at the instructions, directions
or under the state’s control. It was again mentioned the Nicaragua’s case, from
which it results the effective control criteria
that includes this norm. The conclusion was that there weren’t any acts
under the instructions or control of Yugoslavia, but even more the atrocities
were individually inflicted on the civil population at the initiative of some
army members of the Republic of Srpska. In paragraph two of the Court’s decision
it is specified that Serbia did not commit acts of genocide by its organs.
Having in view this decision i can say that all that i have presented until now
paint the true reality which is free of any petty interests that slowly but
certainly led everybody to one-way road to perdition. I will now return to the
initial course of events.
The resolution of the Security
Council from 6 may 1993 number 824[29]
extended the concept of „safe area” to other cities: Sarajevo, Žepa, Goražde,
Tuzla şi Bihać – operative clause, article 3. The manner of approaching the
situation isn’t one that is in accordance with reality, due to the fact that
this concept isn’t clearly defined in any resolution; the report of the
Secretary General from 1 December 1994[30]
explains the situation. Some rules are recommended which applied will confer
increased efficiency to this measure, among them: a clear establishment of the
safe area, total demilitarization of the area, complete freedom of
movement/transit of the local population, U.N. troops and also humanitarian
aids. All the measures are found in page 15 of the report where are also
detailed. Essential is the total demilitarization of these areas, because many
attacks were from this area: military equipments and in the same time military
camps were in these places. The ambiguity of the purpose of these protected
areas was perceived by the serbs as a facilitation awarded to the bosnians to
maintain those territories and not for civil protection. Time passed and a fast
solution was needed, so a eventual peace treaty took shape.
The Vance-Owen Peace Treaty included
the partition of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions by ethnical criteria. Milošević
himself accepted this ideea, and in may 1993, during the Conference in Athens,
was signed by the three representatives of the minorities in Bosnia: Alija-
bosniaks, Tuđman – bosnian croats and Karadžić- bosnian serbians; the signature
of the latter would take effect only
with the condition of the ratification by the Parliament of the Republic of
Srpska. The treaty was accompanied with a determined „NO” from the politicians.
The creation of a strong and independent serbian state would have been
impossible due to the partition, a unitary and ethnically pure state was
desired. Those who first broke the plan were the bosnian croats, with the
purpose of retaking the territories from the south of Bosnia; the city of
Mostar was divided between the muslims and croats. The american administration
got effectively involved, succeeding in ending this conflict by signing a peace
deal between the president of Bosnia and that of Croatia. Consequence of the
parties reaction to the Vince-Owen peace
treaty, resolution 836[31] from 4 june 1993 introduced
for the first time from the beginning of this war a new instrument: use of
force. Visibly the events took an unexpected turnover, and the international community
was totally surprised, the rejection of the treaty was a hard blow given to the
last hope of peace. In the operative clause, articles 9 and 10 contain the
construction „necessary means”, in the first of the two it is explicitly used
the use of force concept. At a close review of the resolution, we will find out
that force would be used if two conditions are fulfilled: the peacekeeping
troops are attacked or the safe areas are bombarded and if the approval from
the Security Council and Secretary General exists. Corroborating these with
article 5 in which it is reiterated the idea of preventing the attacks by the U.N. troops, it results a total lack
of reaction in the majority of the cases. Under no circumstances the intention
of direct confrontation didn’t exist and not even that of saving the civil
population, who was left under the protection of approximately 500 soldiers who
were in each of the so called „safe areas”. I consider that it was waited for a
wrong step from the serbians, an eventual attack which would soon come, so that
the presence of the soldiers would materialize. The most condemnable is the
false hope that civilians legitimately nurtured in avoiding an unwanted tragedy
which was artificially created by a third party, U.S.A. Having in mind what i
said above, the explosion in Bosnia’s capital followed the natural course of
inertia.
Sarajevo returns in public’s
attention on 5 February 1994: explosion in the market of Markale[32].
Serbians were those blamed, and N.A.T.O. reacts for the first time, giving a
ten days ultimatum ordering the retreat of
the serb artillery positioned on the hilltops that surround the city; if
not, the Alliance would have started bombarding
serbian military positions. This ultimatum was backed by U.S.A. and
Great Britain. Russia’s intervention in this equation was determinative, the president
Boris Yeltsin reached an agreement with Karadžić, and in the last day of the
ultimatum russian troops reached Sarajevo, thus a future N.A.T.O attack was
virtually inexistent. The serbians, under the protection of the russians,
accepted the conditions. This submission was just a way of diffusing the hostile
atmosphere created around them and also bought some time for the planning
of a future offensive. In April 1994,
the serbs launch an attack against the city of Goražde, which was under U.N.
protection. At first there wasn’t any response to this attack, but after an
exchange of fire between the serbian troops or Srpska and U.N. troops from which
resulted an allied casualty, N.A.T.O. on the grounds of resolution 836
bombarded a tank and a command post. Mladić ordered his troops to encircle 150
U.N. soldiers who took as hostages, threatening with their own lives.
Confrontations didn’t occur anymore, but the hostage crisis ended, being freed
on 17 April. Mladić’s troops retreated from the city being warned with another
ultimatum and fearing of a new series of bombardments. An aggressor can’t be
equally treated as one that respects the rules, being of good faith, it must be
paralyzed military speaking especially with methods that imply the use of
force. An ultimatum is nothing more than a delay and an invitation that can’t
be refused to more destruction and reprehensible actions. Srebrenica
was the next enclave that got attacked by Mladić’s troops. It must be mentioned
that this operation wasn’t a surprise but foreseeable from three reasons:
1. Both the military and paramilitary serbian troops were in the area
of the enclave since 1992, several confrontations took place for its control
between them and the bosnian troops led by Naser Orić.
2.
Frequent
attacks perpetrated by the bosnians against the troops of Srpska were coming
inside the enclave, although this should have been a demilitarized area and a
„safe” one in accordance with resolution of the Security Council; the secret
operations previously mentioned assured a permanent flux of weapons
3. The attack of the serbian village of Višnjica orchestrated from the order of president Alija on 26 june 1995
On
6 july 1995, Srebrenica was attacked by the serbians. What fallowed next can’t
be rigorously, objectively described existing even today controversies
regarding the total number of the victims among the civilians; the numbers
circulated bring the loss at thousands, due to the fact that a high number of
bosnian refugees sought shelter there, being forced to abandon their homes from
the nearby conflict zones. A fact that must be noted is the lack of any type of
reaction of the U.N. troops- dutch in the most part. In the same line added to
this is the rigidity of the international community which didn’t want to
escalate the conflict, the use of fore was totally excluded. Hence we are
entitled to affirm that this inconceivable inaction was a form of tacit
complicity to the atrocities that were committed! France was the first state
that tried to resolve the conflict: military intervention was their
solution.The americans for the moment didn’t like this approach, their plan was
that of an exchange of territories. Hence the enclaves -where predominant were
the muslims- from the border with Serbia would have been given to them, and on
the N-S part of Bosnia, where predominant were the serbians, to bosnians (
croats and serbians ). The serbs were those who lost the most, because this
move was indirectly following the interests of the croats, who had lost ¼ of
the territory to the serbians. The croat offensive began on 4 august 1995 with
the siege of the capital of Srpska Knin[33]. The city was occupied
relatively easy, the serbs were overwhelmed numerically and military; a great
number of serbs fleed or were killed. The victory consecrated the birth of a
ethnically pure croatian state. It would
have seen that everything headed to a final defeat of the serbian troops and so
to solution of the conflict that had prolonged over the years. The tragedy on
28 august similar to that in Markale had an impact at a international level[34]. The carnage produced
signaled the initiation by N.A.T.O. and americans of the bombardments against
serb positions on bosnian territory. Operation „Deliberate Force” unfolded
between 30 august and 14 september, being one of the biggest of this kind
in both the history of the organization
and Europe after the second world war. This is how an organization with
defensive purposes, conferred only to the member states, intervines in a conflict
which doesn’t target any member and initiates offensive actions. The date of 20
september marks the end of the operation, due to the conformation by the
serbians in retreating their artilery around Sarajevo. Sensing the opportunity
created, both bosniaks and croats tried to exploit as much as possible the
situation in terms of regaining the lost territories. Simetry will be that
which will bring to an end the troubled periode: the americans succeeded in determining the belligerant parties to
sign a ceasefire agreement on 5 october 1995, which culminated with the Peace
Treaty of Dayton, Ohio
A
signature won’t scatter the ghosts of the past who will continue to haunt this
hard tried region. The final purpose hadn’t been achieved yet: Yugoslavia still
„lived”!
Subchapter: Kosovo- between pretext and desideratum
This
province was mentioned for the first time as belonging to the medieval state of
Serbia. In 1346 the Serb Empire is born, and during the XII-XIV centuries a
political and religious center is created in the province. The Kosovo battle
from 1389 meant a hard blow for the serbian nation who lost it against the ottomans.
Kosovo will be part of Ottoman Empire until 1912. The albanians were those who
accepted the islamization of this province, having different posts in the ottoman
administration and persecuted the christians, most of them serbs. A division of
this province was made since this period, the criteria being a religious one.
During the Second World War, the serbs from Kosovo were frequently attacked by
the albanians, over 70.000 serbian families fled from these series of violence.
Atrocities were committed on the grounds of national ideal of „Great Albania”
containing Kosovo, Metohija, parts of
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and the north of Greece. Tito, as a result of
his victory in world war two, issued a decree in 1945 by which serbian
families, who were compelled to leave Kosovo, were forbidden to return. Their
properties were given to the poor albanians, all of this in the name of unity
and yugoslavian brotherhood. During the 40’s, many albanians from Albania established
themselves in Kosovo in consequence. Any form of nationalist manifestation,
including ctricism the anti-serbian measures were harshly suppressed by the
regime. Albanians in Kosovo had a privileged statute, having a better life than
in Albania with lots of services and facilitations at their disposal: schools,
universities, radio and tv stations etc.
The economic crisis at the end of
the 70’s which affected Yugoslavia hit especially the albanian minority in
Kosovo who due to a lack of professional training, a consistent part of them
became jobless. In this cloudy economical context, the start of the 80’s were
again marked by attacks against the serbians; as before the national ideal of
„Great Albania” stood as ground, Kosovo being considered as belonging only to
the albanians. The Constitution from 1974 which i mentioned in subchapter 2.2
contributed in a certain manner in reigniting the self determination flame
around the minorities in the federation. The desperate situation of the
serbians and the loss of governmental
control of this province brought in 1987 to the visit of Slobodan Milošević who
was the president of the Communist Party at that time. A fervent defender of
the serbs rights in Kosovo, his statement: „Here nobody is allowed to hurt you”
will become a strong stimulant in how Serbia will respond to the crisis.
Although the Constitution from 74’ was abolished, the full control of the
serbian government couldn’t be imposed in Kosovo: with the help of the
Communist Party in Albania parallel state structures are created, with them so
separatist movements. A strong military group would soon take control over
these movements: Kosovo Liberation Army – K.L.A. This paramilitary organization
had an extremist approach, fact which was proved in 1998, when over 400 kosovar
albanians were executed just because they opposed the separation from Yugoslavia.
In the same year, U.S.A. designated this organization as a terrorist one, with
connexions among the organized crime. The fighters were armed and trained by
the albanian state. In this matter we can say that Albania becomes an aggressor
state, violating the principles of the U.N. Charter, in a stronger manner
article 2 (4) and in the same time the principles
inserted in the General Assembly’s resolution 2625(XXV)/1970, mainly that of
states refraining from organizing, financing, initiating, inciting or
tolerating subversive, terrorist or armed activities which may interfere with a
civil conflict from another. This chauvinistic practice of imposing with force
your own national desideratum wasn’t sanctioned by the international community.
In 1998, a civil war was taken place: serbs were subjected to inhumane
treatments ( burned in improvised crematories, women were raped ), and during
this time the yugoslav state was trying to reestablish order, but everything
meant failure. An exodus of serbian population to other states includin Serbia
was nothing but a normal reaction to the unfolding events.
The resolution of the Security
Council 1160[35] from 31 March 1998 based on
Chapter VII had the purpose to find a peaceful solution of this conflict. We
can again observe that K.L.A. group is a terrorist one, its actions were
characterized as „terrorist actions”. Also to be noted is the measure from the
operative clause at paragraph 8, that of a military embargo on the territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia- Serbia and Montenegro- including Kosovo. It
was the same measure taken in Bosnia’s case which proved to be inefficient. In
this situation failure awaited also! At the start of April, clashes
intensified, K.L.A. managed to occupy a zone which stretched to the border with
the yugoslav state; the yugoslav army and police started operations to free
these parts. Things seemed to improve in may, when Russia’s president Boris
Yeltsin, and that of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, reached an agreement
regarding an international observer mission in Kosovo starting with june. For
the second time we see the involvement of Russia in the region’s faith in a dark
period, the russians being the only ones that objectively managed to diffuse
the situation both now and during the bosnian war. All of these peaceful
attempts to end the conflict meant an opportunity for the albanian paramilitary
troops to extent their influence in the north of the province. On 23 September,
a new U.N. resolution issued by the Security Council also based on Chapter VII
came to complete the tragic picture. Resolution 1199[36]
imperatively demanded a cease of fire from both sides from this resulting the
fact that the previous resolution was in vain. Also there is a reference to the
avoidance of „an imminent humanitarian catastrophe” by taking adequate actions;
interesting is the introduction in the equation of a certain catastrophe,
although neither of the parties stressed on this fact, and even more it might
seem that it is forgotten the source of these military confrontations which
normally left profound wounds- victims and refugees on either sides- which was
linked to a terrorist network with tied ties with the albanian mafia. It must
be emphasized on the obvious passivity in sanctioning the albanian state which
overwhelmingly contributed in following the course of a „humanitarian crisis”.
In October, a ceasefire agreement was implemented by the international mission
of the O.S.C.E. in Kosovo. From start this agreement didn’t have a key element
to be effective: the signature from the K.L.A. The yugoslav government
fulfilled its obligation to reduce the military contingent and to retreat from
the occupied areas, while the other side took advantage of this momentum, and
military exploited this situation by occupying the territories which were left
by the serbians.
The day of 15 January 1999 will have
an emotional impact and it would turn to play a decisive role in the display of
events, this date being associated with that of the „massacre of Račak“. In the early hours of this day, the
yugoslav army and serbian police took by assault this village after it had
previously used the artillery to siege it; during the whole course of the
operation they were assisted from distance by two representatives of the
O.S.C.E. and representatives of the international press. All of them were
informed by the serbs regarding this action. The purpose of the operation was
to gain control from the K.L.A. Sporadic exchanges of fire took place between
the serbs and kosovar soldiers who retreated in the wood surrounding the village.
The result: 15 casualties among the kosovar soldiers and the capture of
armament, so a success. O.S.C.E. representatives entered the village after the
operation was finished and realized that mostly it was abandoned, and the
persons with who they had contact, despite being wounded, didn’t report
anything suspicious. The next day a number of 45 dead bodies lied in a pit in
the village!
The coordinator of the O.S.C.E.
mission William Walker, guided by the K.L.A. troops who had retaken the village
during the night, blamed without any concrete evidence the serbs. Immediately a
series of phone calls were made to american administration denouncing the
„massacre”. But the scenario isn’t truly believable for many motives:
- The
fact that everybody was informed over this operation represents a justification
of the fact that the serbs hadn’t any intentions to hide its traces
- No
immediate thorough investigation was made on the spot from which to result this
thing; the cartridges which were found were in smaller number than that of the
bodies
-
The remaining civilians, although they knew very well the places in the
village, didn’t see anything suspicious until the paramilitary troops came
- The
K.L.A. presence is an intriguing one- it can be taken into consideration a
possible strategy of them in order to transform a loss into a victory; the
victims of the serbian operation might have been placed there an dressed in
civilian clothes
I consider this episode as a pretext
for the whole international community and an emotional blackmail: civilians are
getting butchered, and „we” only assist and take act of it happening! If Bosnia
had the Srebrenica episode, it looks like Kosovo has the episode of Račak, but at a lesser scale.
In Febraury 1999, the Secretary
General of N.A.T.O. Javier Solano opens the round of negotiations between the
two belligerent sides, these being held in France at the Château de
Rambouillet. I mention the fact that the discussions took place under the
spectrum of the bombardments being started against Serbia by the Alliance in
the case of a eventual failure; in one word, the last chance given to the yugoslavian
state. During these talks, two diametrically oppoesed opinions regarding the
handling of this conflict emerged: the americans were more radical- if the
agreement won’t be signed by the serbs and signed by the albanians, the only
solution was that of the use of force. On the other side, the position of
Europe represented by Great Britain was that of reaching a consensus. The political aspects of this
agreement were accepted by the serbs, it was wished mainly to extend the
autonomy of the Kosovo province, but in no case its independence. One thing
couldn’t be agreed upon: the temporary presence of N.A.T.O. troops in order to
restore peace in the area; this scenario resembled with one of occupation troops
under international mandate! If we study the provisions of this agreement[37], we can make ourselves a
detailed opinion over the way the serbs were perceived. The B Annex, pragraph
8, page 44 reveals that ”N.A.T.O.
personnel shall enjoy, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access
throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters”. May
this condition had been imposed to the other partner of discussion the reaction
would have been of conformation? The states sovereignty is grossly violated,
and this infringement of a fundamental international principle makes me wonder
what were the real intentions of the international community concerning the yugoslav
republic. Chapter 8, article 1, paragraph 3, page 46, dropes a „bait” which
endangers the territorial integrity:”Three years after the entry into force of
this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a
mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the
people, opinions of relevant authorities..” Establishing a fix moment despite
the fact that the situation was extremely complex seems to me an attempt to
hurry up the process, so the result becomes inconvenient. The uncertainty which
comes with the solution is another factor that influenced the serb’s position:
if the albanians in Kosovo would have wanted independence, and the authorities
would have supported the cause, then the conflict would have been closed? The
criteria are purely subjective and don’t have neither juridical nor diplomatic
relevance.
The refusal, justified in this case,
was categorical. The albanians accept! The american scenario is fulfilled. The
result couldn’t have been but only one, and this picture is fully suggestive:
From left to right: Hashim Thaci – the
leader of the K.L.A. group, Bernard Kouchner – the U.N. representative in
Kosovo, Mike Jackson – the commander of K.F.O.R. troops under U.N., Agim Ceku – K.L.A. soldier and Wesley Clark – N.A.T.O. commander.
Belgrade
represented a target wanted for long time. The vital centre of Milošević’s regime had to be silenced once and
for all. Almost 4 months (24 March-11June) of heavy bombardments on the whole
territory of the Yugoslav Republic, including Kosovo. Chaotic and terrifying
scenes occurred mainly among the civilians, absolute normal thing since the
Alliance backed by U.S.A. unleashed their full military power.
Both
during the night .And also during the day :
Taking lives ,spreading pain[41] - the principle by which to
violence you respond with violence has been raised at the rank of a solution at
a international level. The „Kosovo Report” from 2000[42],
made by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, offered a
description of this military campaign. Everything that i will say can be found
in the introductive part of the report in which it is made a summary, and in
the third part, starting with page 30. From the start, the Commision noticed
the fact that, the military intervention orchestrated by N.A.T.O. was illegal,
but justified; illegal because it didn’t have the approval of the Security
Council based on article 53, paragraph 1 („The Security Council shall, where
appropiate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state , as
defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to article 107 or
in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the
part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of
the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing
further aggression by such a state”) and justified because all the diplomatic
means were exhausted, and the effect was that of liberating the majority of the
population in Kosovo from a long period of oppressions under the regime of
Belgrade. In the report two mistakes made by the Alliance are identified all of
which are in terms of planning
- The
campaign was meant to last only a few days, but the duration was much longer-78
days- which took by surprise the governments of the member states
- N.A.T.O.
had mistaken by supposing that the campaign won’t lead to a escalation of the
conflict in terms of expulsions and treatment applied to the kosovar
albanians
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| 5 |
The accuracy of the bombardments was
a doubtful one due to the relatively high altitude at which the jets had to fly
in order to avoid the extremely efficient air defense system of the serbs; a
clear distinction between the real military targets and those artificially
created to deceive, couldn’t be made. The yugoslav army continued its attacks
against K.L.A., and the expulsions and oppressions committed against the
albanian couldn’t be stopped. In april, N.A.T.O. changed its tactics and
started bombarding the infrastructure- bridges, highways, factories etc. From
this resulting a number of 500 victims among the serbian civilians; not even
the albanians were spared in a incident in which 80 lost their lives: the Koriša
tragedy took place because the pilot of an allied jet confused a refugee convoy
with that of a military serb one:
The Commission brings to light the
fact that the Alliance and U.S.A. used types of weapons and munitions which are
forbidden by the Geneva Conventions: cluster bombs- fragments are displaced
when explosion occurs and can harm everyone who are in the area, munitions with
high uranium concentration. The legacy which was left is being felt even today,
situation which was presented by the russian tv channel RT[43].
The conclusion of the Commisison paints the ruthless reality: the war conducted
by N.A.T.O. was neither a success nor a failure, it was both! The serbian
people suffered the most! Kosovo was lost!
The involvement of the Alliance
became certain in January 1999 when it issued a press declaration[44]. From is beginning there is
reference to the resolution 1199 of the Security Council; the crisis in Kosovo
represented a „threat to peace and security in the region”, an in this sense
the strategy is that „to halt the violence and support the completion of
negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a
humanitarian catastrophe”. It might seem
that that imminent „crisis” which resolution 1199 mentioned hadn’t taken place
since the purpose of N.A.T.O. was to avert it. Also in the declaration it is
specified that in case of a diplomatic failure, the Alliance ”is ready to take
whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties compliance with
international commitments and requirements”. The similarity of the expression
used with that in the resolutions that authorize the use of force by the U.N.
member states is striking; with this declaration N.A.T.O.’s policy of finding a
solution to this conflict takes shape, and the wide international community
knew what will happen next. I think that even if the serbs had accepted the
Rambouillet Peace Agreement, bombardments would have still taken place because
the purpose wasn’t by no way „humanitarian”, but political, the target being
the regime in Belgrade. More intriguing in all of this is how an organization
which essence and purpose is purely defensive can resort at attacking another
state which has no links with the organization, thus helping a province, which
is not even a state, clearly not a member of the Alliance. The answer can be
found in the new strategic concept approved by the leaders of the member states
in April 1999[45]. During this time the
operation was unfolding! The new concept enlarges the role of the organization
which includes now management of crisis and conflict prevention by partnerships
with states in the Euro-Atlantic region. The purely defensive role is
redefined, N.A.T.O. ”contributing to the peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic”
– third part of the document. A radical change which happened mainly due to a
simple motive: a flagrant infringement of the initial will of the states of the
Alliance would have occurred in a grossly manner by resorting to force against
Yugoslavia! Kosovo is directly mentioned in this document[46] formulated after NA.T.O.’s
summit in Washington on 24 April the same year, in which a justification of the
operation is put in place:”The continuing crisis in and around Kosovo threatens
to further destabilize areas beyond the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
The potential for wider instability underscores the need for a comprehensive
approach to the stabilization of the crisis region in South-Eastern Europe. We
recognize and endorse the crucial importance of making South-Eastern Europe a
region free from violence and instability”. Only that the desideratum was
disregard in terms of the means used, and the military intervention turned
against the initiators: albanians were even more oppressed and subjected to
violent treatments, which was foreseeable otherwise, things which led to
refugee crisis in Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.). The albanian exodus from Kosovo to
the macedonian borders symbolized a difficult moment, but favorable for new accusations
addressed to the serbian government.
Despite this, the reaction of the
Alliance against Yugoslavia wasn’t unanimously accepted by the members, the
most vocal one was Greece. In the Security Council debates were held both in
favor and against the measure. Those who opposed stated that the action taken
by N.A.T.O. was a clear violation of the U.N. Charter, emphasizing on the
interdiction in absolute terms of the use of force by states, in the second
article, paragraph 4, the primordial role of the Security Council in
maintaining peace and international security in the light of article 24 and in
the same time on the necessary
authorization by the Security Council based on Chapter VII, at the
expense of an unilateral action. Some of the member states supported the idea
that N.A.T.O. represents a regional organization in terms of Chapter VII so it
is limited to the condition imposed by article 53 by which action that implies
force must be authorized by the Security Council[47].
The Security Council urgently reunited
shortly after the bombardments had started [48].
The discussions were contradictory, born from an unseen situation. Russia’s
position in the Security Council was firm and acid:”the risk of the allied
operation won’t address only the province of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, but the
security of the whole Balkan region. The other states allegations regarding the
prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe in the region are viable nor they have
any legal basis, in the same time, the unilateral intervention consists in
itself a possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe”. On the other side, U.S.A.
considered that N.A.T.O. acted in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe
and, also, to hinder new aggressions in Kosovo. In this sense, Great Britain -
the first country that elaborated the concept of humanitarian intervention, see
subchapter 1.3 – offered a legal argument saying that the military action was
legal and justified as being an exceptional measure taken in order to avoid a
humanitarian catastrophe, being directed only to this purpose.
At the second meeting of the
Security Council [49] which had on its agenda the
vote of a resolution which condemned the use of force by the Alliance, the
states couldn’t reach a common position, thus it wasn’t adopted. It mentioned
that the unilateral use of force by N.A.T.O. represented a violation of article
2(4), article 24 and article 53. Those who spoke against the military action
(Cuba, India, Russia, China, Ukraine and Belarus) were very clear in terms
of violating the Charter, whereas the
states that agreed with the military intervention focused on the violent acts that
continued against the albanian minority. Previous resolutions of the Security
Council were brought into discussion, which demanded the yugoslav state to end
its violent policy. Though these resolutions didn’t clearly authorize the use
of force by the N.A.T.O. members, some states argued that in a certain way the
intervention was justified. France concluded that two resolutions were adopted:
in resolution 1199 the Council reaffirmed that the deteriorating situation in
Kosovo had become a threat to peace and security in the region. Resolution 1203
demanded the implementation of the agreements between Yugoslavia, O.S.C.E. and
N.A.T.O. and how the yugoslav state failed to do so, the military response was
a consequence to this. Holland also agreed with these statements and said that
the given situation was a complex one and so a conclusion can’t be drawn over
this being a strictly unilateral use of force. Slovenia, former Yugoslav
Republic, adopted a similar position adding that the responsibility of the Security
Council regarding the use of force is primary, but not exclusive, N.A.T.O.
being entitled to act. U.S.A. didn’t try to legally substantiate its position,
saying only that the Alliance’s actions were fully justified and necessary in
order to stop the violence and to prevent a further deterioration of the peace
and security in the region [50].
Humanitarian intervention is
frequently used by the states referring to the Kosovo crisis. This aspect is new and it hasn’t been strictly legally
regulated. For this reason, in order to better understand this concept, you
must turn to the doctrine regarding it. Author Bruno Simma in its book „NATO,
the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspect”(1999) makes a step. In his view, if
the Security Council determines that gross human rights violations had taken
place in a country, which consists in a threat to peace and then appeals or
authorizes an action in force to stop these, then a military humanitarian
intervention is permitted. In the absence of an authorization, military coercion
which proposes to determine the state to respect those fundamental rights
represents a violation of article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter; so both the
doctrine and the states reached the same logical conclusion. Continuing, the
author affirms that as long as the violence doesn’t spread across the border in
way which an armed attack is committed against a state, article 51 – the
inherent right of each state to self defense – can’t be invoked. To conclude,
any political, ethnical, humanitarian etc. explanation or justification can’t
eliminate certain legal forms that must be accomplished for the simple fact
that there are the result of the states will, which prevails and fundaments the
international law. Throughout time, some common characteristics of this type of
intervention crystallized, the source being doctrine itself:
1. Use of military force – this dimension is due to the fact in the
majority of cases, the state against the intervention is conducted to is the
source of the rights violations, so this approach is needed
2. Lack of approval from the state on which it is intervened upon –
this element makes the distinction between peacekeeping missions and in the
same time makes reference to the main subject, the state, which won’t never agree
with this form of sanction
3. The purpose is the protection of those of other nationality
4. Mediation of the intervention – states intervening on their own
(„self-help”), but this measure is criticisable, because this action is
prefered to take place under U.N. mandate
These elements are met
in our case, thus doctrinary speaking, states reacted in this sense. The
concept is a controversial one and suffered many changes troughout history.
During the Cold War, humanitarian interventions – India in East Pakistan today
Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda – took place even without the Council’s authorization,
often these had political valences and marked areas of influence. Once the Cold
War ended, the ideea of multilateral intervention took the place of the
unilateral one hence avoiding abuses from the powerful states; multilateralism
became a guarantee over the legitimacy of the action. Cases in which this type
of intervention is applied are associated with those in which grave human
rights violation occur, and when there is a threat to peace and security. Still
humanitarian intervention isn’t a doctrine and doesn’t have the position of a
international norm by which state policies are being shaped; this caution of
institutionalization is caused by the states fear to be subjugated to the
political influences of the power poles at the international level under this
pretext, and in the same time, in case of an authorized intervention, U.N.
doesn’t have its own military troops, so the initiation of the operation is
decided by some group of influencial states.
Year 2001 was a radical one in the
sense of those presented above: the canadian government laid down the
foundations of the „International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty”, which draw up the report „The responsibility to protect”[51]. Optics schange, and the
right to intervene in converted in the responsibility of each state to prevent
atrocities being committed by state through different economical, diplomatic
means, the use of force would be resorted to in case the first two fail. The
report emphasizes on preventing the following types of international crimes:
genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace and ethnic cleansing. This
limitation was criticized by the states due to this restriction. At the base of
the responsibility to protect are the following principles:
- State
sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the
protection of its people lies with the state itself
- Where
a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect
Debates over multilateralism or
unilateralism of the humanitarian intervention disappear, and their place is
taken by the sovereignty principle, which in exceptional and of strict
interpretation cases, can be mitigated only for social protection purposes. The
responsibility to the use of force is given in the last instance to the
Security Council based on Chapter VII, and beside this responsibility to react,
states have the duty to contribute in post-conflict reconstruction. A negative
aspect that with certainty be taken into considerations by the states is its
legal force: it isn’t a international law, but a norm based on international
law, meant to organize a framework in which means of resolving a conflict
mentioned previously are put in place. Through resolution 1674[52] from 26 April 2006, U.N.
embraced the principles inserted in the report; a tight cooperation between it
and different regional organizations over the prevention of new conflicts was
strengthened. In the same time the four pylons that stand at the base of united
nation’s system were mentioned: peace, security, progress at international level
and human rights. In the same resolution, the organization expressed its deeply
regret caused by suffering civilians in armed conflicts, them being the most
exposed to the states abuses; a higher degree of protection was granted
especially to them. Unfortunately this reaction is delayed which won’t wipe out
the caused by an inexplicable passivity of the whole international community,
exactly in the crucial moments. The subsequent demarche creates the impression
of a penitently attitude by which clemency is being seek, thing that lacks any moral
consistency.
Returning to the conflict in Kosovo
which prolonged for a long period of time, it ended with resolution 1244[53]. The solution was obviously
political, thus both parties accepted to cease hostilities and accept the
trusteeship of the international community in this province throughout
different peacekeeping mission and post-conflict reconstruction. An essential
component of this resolution is that of Yugoslavia’s integrity that won’t be
affected in no manner, Kosovo remaining part of the republic but with higher
autonomy – article 10, operative clause. The yugoslavs were the one ones who
fulfilled their obligations ( the military personnel was retreated), but the
albanians continued their attacks, their actions remained the same, with
terrorist implications, spreading also in F.Y.R.O.M. (Macedonia).
Yougoslavia tried to find justice and
resorted to the International Court of Justice, issuing a lawsuit against ten
N.A.T.O. member states, including U.S.A.: Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Holland,
Germany, Canada, Portugal, France and Belgium. The allegations that were
brought were that each of the states violated their obligation of not using the
force by participating in the allied operation and of not interfering in the
internal affairs of a state by training K.L.A. terrorists. Two arguments were
elaborated against the military operation: the first was that the is no right
to humanitarian intervention in the international law, and the second, even if
it were, the methods used, bombardments, don’t make a humanitarian
intervention. Supporting its first argument, Yougaslavia revealed that the
interdiction in article 2(4) is a absolute one, and intervening for others
special reasons than „against territorial integrity or political independence
of any state” doesn’t stand up. The formulation, in states opinion, allows the
use of force against other purposes than the integrity or political
independence. The practice of the states regarding this international norm
wasn’t distorted, proof in this sense is that not even one member state could
provide substantial evidences from which to result the contrary. In the case of
the second argument, Yugoslavia stated that there wasn’t a genuine humanitarian
purpose, and it also added that the way in which it was used can’t qualify this
operation as a humanitarian intervention; the targets of this campaign, and
the extended geographical area targeted
indicate other purposes than humanitarian. Protecting a minority from a region
exposed the other communities on the whole yougoslav territory to severe
bombardments. In the same time, the threats issued by N.A.T.O. months before
starting the operation meant that the result was foreseeable, and acquiring an
authorization from the Security Council was never planned to happen.
Personally, i consider these arguments logical and common sense, having a legal
and political substrate, things which make us to believe that finally light
will be brought to this case also, and the desired justice won’t come late.
Defending themselves, states described the atrocities perpetrated against albanians, the only state that offered a legal explanation was Belgium who showed that the intervention was based on the implicit authorization from the Security Council. It was necessary to intervene in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to protect fundamental human rights that are ius cogen norms. I consider that a difference must be made between „implicit” and „tacit”! The strong argument is found in previous resolutions that expressed exactly this describing the situation in Kosovo as a threat to peace and security; we can realize that, although it wasn’t certainly demanded, the intervention happened for the simple fact that the use of force wasn’t excluded, neither resolution had excluded the possibility, and this threat was a insidious green light for the use of force. This deduction hasn’t, obviously, any legal consistency and it dangerously creates precedents. Let’s report to a case in nowadays: the situation in Syria has the same ingredients for a so called humanitarian intervention, but nobody is determined to act. Fundamental rights are being violated mainly the right to life, by bombarding civilian areas the number of refugees represents a problem for the neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan and not to mention that it represents a threat to peace in the region. The explanations offered in the Yugoslavia’s case don’t do anything than to nurture even more the inevitable tensions of such a conflict, thing that was shown during the post-conflict years. Belgium also argued that there was no U.N. resolution which condemned the measures taken by the Alliance, but it is notoriously that the vote has in 90% of the cases political interests and affinities. The International Court chose a diplomatic answer on everybody’s taste, but one meant to standardize the treatment applied to the serbs: the Court declared itself „concerned” regarding the events that occurred, reminding the material loss and that of human lives, affirming that all the parties of this lawsuit must take into consideration international law, U.N. Charter, and humanitarian law. This is how the yugoslav state, nation was made „checkmate” in a subtle way and with medical precision. What was wanted was achieved: colonization of the balkans with free markets, western principles and above all, „protection of human rights”!
Defending themselves, states described the atrocities perpetrated against albanians, the only state that offered a legal explanation was Belgium who showed that the intervention was based on the implicit authorization from the Security Council. It was necessary to intervene in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to protect fundamental human rights that are ius cogen norms. I consider that a difference must be made between „implicit” and „tacit”! The strong argument is found in previous resolutions that expressed exactly this describing the situation in Kosovo as a threat to peace and security; we can realize that, although it wasn’t certainly demanded, the intervention happened for the simple fact that the use of force wasn’t excluded, neither resolution had excluded the possibility, and this threat was a insidious green light for the use of force. This deduction hasn’t, obviously, any legal consistency and it dangerously creates precedents. Let’s report to a case in nowadays: the situation in Syria has the same ingredients for a so called humanitarian intervention, but nobody is determined to act. Fundamental rights are being violated mainly the right to life, by bombarding civilian areas the number of refugees represents a problem for the neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan and not to mention that it represents a threat to peace in the region. The explanations offered in the Yugoslavia’s case don’t do anything than to nurture even more the inevitable tensions of such a conflict, thing that was shown during the post-conflict years. Belgium also argued that there was no U.N. resolution which condemned the measures taken by the Alliance, but it is notoriously that the vote has in 90% of the cases political interests and affinities. The International Court chose a diplomatic answer on everybody’s taste, but one meant to standardize the treatment applied to the serbs: the Court declared itself „concerned” regarding the events that occurred, reminding the material loss and that of human lives, affirming that all the parties of this lawsuit must take into consideration international law, U.N. Charter, and humanitarian law. This is how the yugoslav state, nation was made „checkmate” in a subtle way and with medical precision. What was wanted was achieved: colonization of the balkans with free markets, western principles and above all, „protection of human rights”!
The scenario has ended: Bosnia and
Herzegovina tries to escape poverty due to the standards imposed by the
European Union, Kosovo developed in a tremendous manner that in 2008 became
even a state, and Yugoslavia exists only in the souls and hearts!
CHAPTER III
Serbian, bosnian, croatian,
albanian, slovenian or montenegrean? In reality, humans united in language,
culture and feeling! No drawn boundary on a computer or on an old map can’t
ease the riotousness that will be inherited by generations. Evidently that
these events which unfolded are far away and anachronistic in our current
context of everybody’s Europe that confronts itself with a crisis at a more
elevated level, born from a tight „friendship and cooperation”. But, i can’t
believe that someone who lived or had the privilege to inform himself and to
know all of this can forget or consider
that everything will be the same. Nothing will be as it was! Painful isn’t the
violent display of events, but the misleading even cunning way that some
individuals – human beings as us – can model universal values in a way in which
it becomes a stimulus for committing atrocities; freedom is what each of us
can’t conceive in no way to loose and thus it being one that animates us to
separation in the moment in which we are in danger of being without it. The
thing that made me wonder a lot in this war is that of disbelief that persists,
it couldn’t be eradicated. Horrendous manner in which life can end: killed by a
neighbor with who you yesterday talked and helped, killed by a friend on who
you could always rely on. This war made more havocs on the psychological realm
than in its materiality.
I consider that the fate of all the victims
was decided earlier, and their chances were as non-existent because those who
had to mediate this SOCIAL and not MILITARY crisis created a scenario in
accordance with the actual situation: force in the place of words and words in
the place of actions! All of these undesired conjunctures which were provoked
by different internal and external factors, led to true identity crisis:
communities became discriminatory and exclusion transformed itself in an appurtenance
criteria. This is the cause of the resounding failure of the international
society. My ascertainment is strengthened also by the way things ended: it was
concluded that there is only a guilty one and not more.
A
clear evidence of the fact that, in certain situations, lack of involvement is
by itself the solution exactly as when we don’t intervene to save a victim from
car crash who is stuck in the car and prefer to wait for the medics to come in
order not to do more harm. At the beginning of my work i referred to the
diversity which is linked to the formation of the yugoslav, and now i can
surely say that it is both the cause and the solution. Our human nature is
individualistic and our degree of tolerance is relatively low, but this
limitation is not insurmountable, and can be cultivated and in the end humanity
which lies in each of us will prevail. We might think that the cries for help
and prayers of those who left us were covered by the hiss of the bombs and
shouts of war, but they are being heard each year!
May
peace and harmony return again!
- Costas -
- Costas -
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http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm
·
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm
·
http://smsjm.vse.cz/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/sp30.pdf
·
http://blog.balder.org/billeder-blog/Hashim-Thaci-Bernard-Kouchner-Mike-Jackson-Kfor-Agim-Ceku-Uck-Wesley-Clark-October-1999-320.jpg
·
http://libcom.org/files/images/history/CK_building_on_fire_1999%5B1%5D.jpg
·
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/images/0504-02.jpg
·
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/the_kosovo_report_and_update.pdf
·
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DpF7RCpEI8U
·
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm
·
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
·
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm
·
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/United_Nations_Security_Council_Meeting_3988_1010.3370v1.pdf
·
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
·
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674%282006%29
[1] See
http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/carta_natiunilor_unite/
[2]It is the most important international organization
in the world.Founded in 1945, after the second world war, today it has 192
member states. Its creation was made possible by signing, by its members that
founded it, of the U.N. Charter
[4]See http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consiliul_de_Securitate_al_ONU.
[5] See
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement
[6] See
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6505.pdf
[7]See A.Năstase, B.
Aurescu, C. Jura, Manualul de Drept
Internațional Public – Sinteze pentru Examen, Ediția 5, Editura C.H.Beck,
București, 2009 .
[9] See Ch. Gray , International law and the use of force,
second edition, Oxford University Press,
Chapter 2, p.35.
[11] See http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/54/plenary/a54-1.pdf, Chapter 1,
Paragraph 66, p.8.
[13]The Axis powers also known as the Axis
Alliance, was the alignement of nations that fought in the Second World War
against the Allied forces. The Axis promoted the alliance as a part of a
revolutionary process aimed at breaking the hegemony of plutocratic-capitalist
Western powers and defending civilization from communism
[14] The
Group of the 77 at the United Nations is a loose coalition of developing
nations, designed to promote its members’ collective economic interests and
create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. The group
was founded on June 15, 1964 by the „Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven
Countries” issued at the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
[15] The
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states which are not formally aligned
with or against any major power bloc. The organization was founed in Belgrade
in 1961, and was largely conceived by India’s first prime minister, Jawarhalal
Nehru; Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno; Egypt’s second president, Gamal
Abdel Nasser; Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah; and Yougoslavia’s
president, Josip Brotz Tito
[16]Ronald
Wilson Reagan, (b.febraury 1911, Tampico, Illinois - d.5
june 2004, Los Angeles, California) was
the 40th President of the United States. As president, Reagan implemented
sweeping new political and economic initiatives
[17] See http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2222t.gif.
[18]See Bill Text 101st Congress
(1989-1990)H.R.5114.ENR H.R.5114 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both
Houseand Senate] - ENR).
[20]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dd9nITrjyM.
[21]See Resopution
A/RES/46/237.
[22]See
http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/yugoslavia/yugoslavia-1991/un-security-council-resolution-713-1991.
[23]See Christine Gray,
op.cit,Chapter 4, p.106.
[24]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OohDHm1mcc&feature=player_embedded#!.
[25]See
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/221/90/IMG/N9322190.pdf?OpenElement.
[26]See
http://www.srebrenica.nl/Content/NIOD/English/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf.
[27]See
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/187/17/IMG/N9318717.pdf?OpenElement.
[31]See
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/330/21/IMG/N9333021.pdf?OpenElement.
[32]See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMkqCncevBA.
[33]See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFfDlPpLuLI
[34]See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1QCNeAhxoo
[35]See
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm
[36]See http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm
.
[37]See
http://smsjm.vse.cz/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/sp30.pdf
[38]See
http://blog.balder.org/billeder-blog/Hashim-Thaci-Bernard-Kouchner-Mike-Jackson-Kfor-Agim-Ceku-Uck-Wesley-Clark-October-1999-320.jpg
[39]See
http://libcom.org/files/images/history/CK_building_on_fire_1999%5B1%5D.jpg
[40]See
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/images/0504-02.jpg
[42]See
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/drwcasebook/files/the_kosovo_report_and_update.pdf
[43]See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DpF7RCpEI8U
[44]See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm
[45]See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
[46]See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm
[47]See Christine Gray , op.cit.,
Chapter 2, p.39
[48]See http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/United_Nations_Security_Council_Meeting_3988_1010.3370v1.pdf
[50]A se vedea Christine
Gray , op.cit.,Chapter 2, pp. 40-41
[51]See http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
[52]See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674%282006%29
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